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Abstract. 
Why do ethnically minority parties succeed or fail to win seatsワ
To solve this puzzle， this article explores cross'national and 
inter-temporal differences in the post-communist new democracies 
This study argues that governmental policy positions and the strategic 
behaviour of ethnic minorities determine the success and failure 
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Introduction and method 
Why do ethnic minority parties win seats in sorne countries 
but not in others? Why do ethnic parties rise or fal in the same 
country? Since many Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries 
democratised in the late 1980s and early 1990s， several ethnic minority 
groups have had the chance to voice their own interests through 
the electoral system and party politics. These processes led to the 
emergence of ethnic parties in several countries. For example， the 
Turkish minority's party has won a vast number of seats in the 
Bulgarian parliament. The Russian minority in Latvia formed political 
parties and holds capital city local government. Contrastingly， many 
Gagauzians living in Moldova have failed to elect their own ethnic 
parties to the Moldovan Parliament. The Russian minority in Estonia 
rarely support the ethnic Russian parties nowadays despite their 
popularity among Russian voters in the 1990s. How should we interpret 
these variations in political party systems between countries and 
overtime? 
Such questions have typically been accounted for by classically 
institutional or socio"economic explanations， as Meguid (2005) pointed 
out. However， as many new studies have observed these types of 
classic explanations trend limitations to some extent and rarely 
solve a puzzle like the one mentioned above. When institutional 
and socio-economic explanation show some limitations， actor-centric 
perspective will be useful. Building on theoretical works that are 
more actor-oriented which assuming strategic behaviour of political 
parties and ethnic minority voters， this study argues that setting 
policy related to national integration， such as language law and 
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franchising， are important variables in explaining the variance of 
ethnic parties' representation. In addition， the rationality of ethnic 
minorities is a very important assumption to support this hypothesis 
and explain the variances across party systems 
This article consists of three parts. The first section represents 
a theoretical review of the literature， show limitations of institutional 
and socio-economic explanation， and summarize recent researches 
The second section offers an original hypothesis， deduced theoretically 
from a simply formalized model. In the third section， multi-regression 
analyses for seventeen CEE countries verify the hypothesis and 
inspect the causal efects of several variables. Throughout， this paper 
use the term 'ethnic minority' frequently as a term that includes 
the broader concept of ethnic minorities， national minorities and 
minority races， and define 'ethnic party' as 'the political party which 
insists on a particular ethnic minority group's interests as first 
among others' (Chandra 2009) 
Limitations of Institutional and Societal Explanations 
In a broader meaning， the situation of ethnic parties could 
be characterized as a question of political party systems and a 
question of political representation by smal groups. When we try 
to examine an ethnic party's situation， theories of political party 
systems should be mentioned. Classically， the variations in party 
systems have been observed mainly from two perspectives. 80me 
scholars have emphasised the impact of institutional effects， and 
other scholars have focused on socio・economicfactors. However， after 
the Third Wave of Democratization， these two classical types of 
explanations have showed their limitations in some extent 
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Since Duverger's (1954) seminal work， political scientists have 
been eager to answer why some states have many political parties 
in their parliament while others have only a few. Institutionalists 
often have stressed the significance of electoral rule， majoritarian 
or proportional， to explain the variance of party systems. Other 
institutionalists who have paid attention to the magnitude of electoral 
districts assume that smal minority parties tend to get seats in 
a district wherever or whenever the elctoral magnitude is high 
However， several scholars (Moser 1999; Kitschelt 2000; Moser and 
Scheiner 2004， 2009) have argued that the electoral systems in 
post-communist democracies do not affect in these areas as Duverger 
said， but rather institutional factors will affect it in a reverse way 
(Meleshevich 2007) 
Table 1 clearly exh尚北sthe limitation of institutional explanation 
in CEE countries. Several ethnic parties have won seats even their 
countries' electoral magnitudes have been low. Contrastingly， several 
ethnic minority groups have failed to represent its ethnic parties 
with high magnitude electoral system. Even it is also true that 
several ethnic parties have won seats in high magnitude electoral 
system and vice versa. In sum， it is appropriate to argue that 
institutional factor (electoral magnitude in table 1) could not be 
a single significant factor to explain minority representations， or 
have weak effect at least. 
-4 (206)ー
Explaining the Fate of Ethnic Minority Parties {Nakai} 
Table 1: Ethnic Darties' reDresentations and institutionallsocietal factors 
electoral mag川tude(institutional factor) 
ethnic party 
wm seats 
ethnic pa目y
does not 
、;vmseats 
ethnic pa代y
、;vmseats 
cthnic paはy
does not 
、;vinseats 
under 7日1
Russian (Estonia; bcfo問99)，
Russian (Latvia)， Gennan 
(Poland)， Albanian削acedonia;
after02)， Se出ian(Macedonia; 
after02)， Roma (Macedonia; 
after02)， Turkish (Bulgaria)， 
Hungarian (Romania) 
Russ凶n(Es旬nia;afteru3)， Slovak 
(Czech)， Roma (Czech)， Hungarian 
(Roma刷a)，ltalian and Hungarian 
(Sloveniai， Serbian (Croatiai， 
Roma (Croatia)， Albanian 
(Macedonia; before98)， Serbian 
(Ma田donia;bcforc98)， Roma 
(Macedonia; be伽 e98)，Roma 
他ulgaria)，Gennan (Romaniai， 
竺旦金旦記込
over 701 
Polish (Lithuania)， Hungarian 
(Slovakia)， Hungarian 
(Serbia)， Bosniak (Serbia)， 
Serbian (Montenegro)， Greek 
(Albania) 
Russian (Lithuania)， Roma 
(Slovakia)， Croat (Serbia)， 
Roma (Serbia)， Gagauzian 
(恥101dova)，Slavic peop1e 
(Moldova)， Russ叩 1
(Ukraine)， Crimean Tatar 
(Ukraine) 
demographic composition (societal factor) 
under 5 percent 
Gennan (Poland)， Hungarian 
(Scrbia)， Bosniak (Scrbia)， Grcck 
(Albania)， Serbian (Albania; 
aftc凶2)
Roma (Czech)， Slovak (Czech)， 
Italian and Hungarian (Slovenia)2， 
Roma (Croatia)， Croat (Serbia)， 
Roma (Serbia)， Serbian 
(Macedonia; before98)， Gem聞 1
(Romania) 2， Gagauzian (Moldova)， 
Slavic People (Moldova)， Russian 
(Ukraine)， Crimean Tatar 
(Ukraine) 
Over 5 percent 
Russian(Estonia;bcforc99)， 
Russian (Latvia)， Polish 
(Lithuania)， Hungarian 
(剖ovakia)，Serbian 
ゆ1accd叩陥)，Albanian 
(Macedonia; after02)， 
Roma (Macedonia; afte同2)，
Turkish (Bulgaria)， 
Hungarian (Romania)， 
Russian (Lithuania)， 
Russian(Estonia;after03)， 
Roma (Slovakia)， 
Roma(Hung町)，Serbリan
(Croatia)2， Albanian 
(Macedonia; befo陀 98)，
Roma (Macedonia; 
before98)， Roma (Bulgaria)， 
主旦笠旦出弘
1. an average of electoral mag印刷dein CEE countries is around 70 
2. taking a seat only in ethnic minority special mandate seats is not sorted out as “winning seats" 
here 
Source: Cordel and 、，volfeds. 2口04;Bugajski 2005; and each state centra1 electoral committee's 
webpage 
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Other scholars have treated socio・economicvariance as the most 
important factor. The brilliant work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967)， 
the godfathers of the socio-economic perspective in party-system 
formation， has suggested that social cleavages define the situation 
in parliament. If a country has many social cleavages， economic， 
or class struggles will yield a polarised parliament. Works that 
emphasise the special role of ethnic voting and see an ethnic line 
as an essential cleavage are also categorised here. Essentialists 
have emphasised that ethnic minorities feel the greatest pleasure 
in voting itself， not by receiving some political and material benefits 
through an election， because ethnic minorities place a special emphasis 
on the effusion and the manifestation of their identity 
Socio-economic explanations also have not accounted for 
post-communist Europe countries and show limitations. We easily 
understand that demographic intensities of ethnic minorities have 
never mattered for ethnic parties' representation as shown in table 
1. Moreover， even though al CEE countries have some differences 
in their histories and international relations， but most of them 
have faced similar political tasks (Geddes 1995; Millard 2004). Most 
of them have faced economic privatization， democratization， the need 
to rebuild the nation， pension reform and debates concerning whether 
or not to join the EU. Whitefield (2002) asserted that CEE countries 
generaly had dealt with similar political tasks despite their unique 
historical and socio-economic contexts. He inspected 12 CEE countries' 
'political cleavages' and presented 10 of them that had ethnic problems 
as cleavages. However， their party systems as related to ethnic 
parties have displayed differences. 
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Applying Spatial Theory for Ethnic Voting 
Recent literatures have tried to account for the variation of 
party systems from a more actor'oriented approach. Some studies 
explain how those varied circumstances can be accounted for by 
differences that result from interest coordination between political 
parties and voters. Horowitz and Brown (2005) verified through 
regression analysis that institutional variables and socio-economic 
variables were invalid in explaining political party systems in CEE 
countries， including the number of significant political parties. They 
argued instead that the ideological concentration'polarization in 
political party systems is a very significant variable. Ideological 
positioning should be treated as a set of policy positions for each 
party. In short， to explain the variance in ethnic parties' situations， 
we must pay attention to policy positions. Mahr and Nagle (1995) 
emphasised policy positions in CEE countries and noted differences 
between western and eastern party systems 
Every party seeks power resources in electoral markets， and 
ethnic minority voters， like al other voters， try to register their 
preferences for officeholders in parliament through elections. In the 
post'communist emerging democracies， generaly speaking， 
organizational bases for each political party are weak and highly 
vulnerable. In addition， voters support for each party and linkage 
between parties and societies are so fluid and unconsolidated (Kitchelt 
et al 1999; Lewis 2003). This situation let each party have strong 
incentives to appeal various voters for support maximization. As 
Kitschelt (2000) pointed out， ethnic groups remained as solid societal 
groups after the atomization in the communist era. Under the newly 
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democratized situations， voters does not have enough political 
knowledge about political parties (]ike policy orientation， credibility， 
interest structure， and so on)， hence they tend to rely on more 
visible factors of candidate like their ethnicity. Consequently， several 
political parties， even organized by ethnic majority， try to retain 
ethnic minorities' vote by credit claiming or by pork barrel measures 
Birnir (2007) argued that ethnic representations are never always 
"intransigent" and it is less possible that ethnic minorities cast 
a ballot for ethnic minority parties when saliency of ethnic cleavages 
defined by governmental policy or ethnic attractor is low. Kostadinova's 
regression analysis showed that， even though it was not the main 
point of her argument， ethno-linguistic fractionalization index variables 
have never had unique and static effects to account for party system 
polarization (Kostadinova 2002). Although some scholars have argued 
that ethnic minority voting behaviour have its own specialty (Cox 
1997; Horowitz 1985)， Cox's own regression analysis implied that 
societal ethnic factors never affected the results of voting behaviour 
It is possible that ethnic voters have voted strategically， using 
their rationality as every voter does. This research assumes rationality 
as voters could vote retrospectively evaluating politicians actions 
(Fiorina 1981). Chandra (2004， 2009) theorises about the mechanism 
that generates differences of support for ethnic parties in each local 
district in India. If margins of win by ethnic parties in electoral 
district at last time is larger than the percentage of minorities 
in that district， leverage of voting its party go negative. Itmeans 
that ethnic minority voters will abandon their votes for the ethnic 
parties and seek other parties that tend to contribute to their political 
and material interests. In short， ethnic minority voters behave very 
strategically Oike as every voters do) and not ideologically且xlng
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They wilJ react to a political elites' policy performance and its changes， 
and will try to prevent their vote from being wasted. Since their 
behaviour resembles strategic votingW and react appropriately for 
policy change， we are able to treat ethnic voting behaviour as usual 
voting behaviour is. Even though some theorists of electoral studies 
and strategic voting have hedged， saying that their theoretical frames 
would be inapplicable for ethnic voters， 1 argue that it is more 
appropriate to treat ethnic voters in the same way as 'normal' 
voters 
Formalizing these arguments with the basic Hoteling (1929) 
model，ωthis article represents a simple frame to show the voting 
behaviour of ethnic minorities and the situation of ethnic parties 
in national parliaments 
E型旦ユ
D 
Q 
PJ v， P2 P， 
(1) There are several definitions of'strategic voting'. This article defines ithere 
as 'casting a vote for a second-or third-best party to escape wasting a vote' 
121 This model has been famous asan original work folowing Downs (19571 model 
The argument about the reasonability around this model wil be omitted from 
the present article because there are a vast number ofworks from the past 80 
years， and it is out of domain tothis work 
-9(211lー
Explaining the Fate of Ethnic Minority Parties {Nakai} 
Fi郡lre1 denotes a highly hypothetical situation in which there 
are only three political parties in parliament. Party A shal be 
a conservative political party and mainly supported by titular majority 
people. Party B shall be a liberal political party and also mainly 
supported by titular majority people. Party C shall be a small ethnic 
minority party. We can assume that every policy， including integration 
policy， will be determined by bargaining and coordination among 
the big parties， A and B， because party C is relatively small and 
unable to mobilise well to exert its presence. Every party has a 
linear function representing subjective costs that the voters feel 
in voting for each party. If the policy positions of party j， represented 
as Pj， and the preferences of voter i (Ui) are quite the same， voter 
will not feel any cost (other than the cost of voting itseli) ， but 
the broader the distance between the party j stance and the voter 
preference， the more discount cost Dυ= I pr u;I the voter will feel 
A voter will vote for a party that they perceive costs them the 
least. Moreover， when voters perceive a very high cost of voting 
for any party， they will not cast a vote. Then， there should be 
the concept of a cost permissible limit for every voter i， and it 
is represented as a function Qi. Ifand only if Dυ>Qi for any j， 
voter does not vote for any party. 
However， most ethnic smal parties suffer from an inability 
to win an election， and we should also take this into account in 
the calculation， along with policy positions. Every voter feels some 
discount cost to vote for a small party because hislher vote could 
be wasted. This extra discount cost feelings for voting for a smal 
party could be represented as an increase on the discount cost 
function， like party C in Figure 2 
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堕型堕2
D 
Q 
V_D_ V 2.F3 • I P2 P， 
In this situation， distance between policy position of party P3 
and preference of voter U1 is closer than distance between p2 and 
U1. However， voter U1 cast their ballot for party B in this world， 
because that choice costs less. In other words， D 1.2 is smaler than 
D 1，3 
Let us consider about policy change. When political party B 
shifts their policy stance from p2 to P2'， it is denoted as Figure 
3 below， and the voter U2 is likely to change hislher voting party 
Because the Dd became smaller than D2.3 
E型旦2
D 
Q 
VzP; P; v， P， 
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Now， the policy change of Party B from p2 to P2' means that 
every potential supporter for party C could change their voting 
preference from Party C to Party B. If we define and express this 
situation in natural language， many members of the electorate Gn 
this article， this means minority voters) cast their ballot for a large， 
second-best party even though they know there is a party whose 
policy is quite close to their preferences， in order to avoid wasting 
a vote. It is reasonable to assurne that a policy change should 
be treated as significant variables to explain the variation in ethnic 
parties' fates based on theoretical deduction. It leads to the hypotheses 
below 
Hypothesis 1 
The vote share of ethnic parties is affected by other parties' 
(or governmentaJ) policy change 
In addition， a rival hypothesis will be represented as below 
Hypothesis 2. 
If an institutional design is advantageous (high proportionality， 
low threshold and large magnitude of a district) for a smal 
party， the ethnic minority parties will win seats. 
Hypothesis 3. 
If the society is more fractionalised in terms of ethnicity， or 
has much ethnic minority population， ethnic minority parties 
could win seats. 
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Statistical Analysis 
To evaluate the hypothesis presented above， this study empiricaly 
analyzes the relationship between electoral outcomes and the 
government position on national integration policies toward ethnic 
minority groups. The integration policy refers to several factors， 
such as politics， economics and social concerns， hence these factors 
are integrated into a set of policy initiatives. Even if it is dificult 
to estimate and score the individual parties' policy stance over several 
years and in several different countries， we can estimate the 
governmental policy or stance that has been generated by coordination 
among significant political parties 
This analysis takes into account several other factors. Institutional 
factors consist of several aspects， as mentioned in literature review 
section， like the elctoral system， magnitude of electoral districts 
and so on. Societal factors consist of mainly the language.group 
or ethnic.group situation. External diplomatic factor wil also be 
tested 
The unit of analysis is each ethnic group in each election in 
each CEE country. For example， Lithuania has two ethnic 
groups. Russians and Poles. and they have experienced elections 5 
times， this his generates 10 cases in the dataset. The ethnic party's 
seats and policy variables are coded separately to correspond with 
each ethnic group. A country.year， which is coded as 'democracy' 
at Polity IV and as 'free' at Freedom House， shal only be used 
in this data sample because this research treats electoral issues 
(See Appendix). For example， Croatia in the '90s shal be excluded 
from this dataset because it was coded as 'Not Free' by Freedom 
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House at that time. 
Dependent vcαnαble 
It measures proportion (permillage) of seat share by ethnic 
minority parties calculated from each country's election result 
Determination of ethnic parties has been made in line with Bugajski's 
work (2002)， and several expert literatures (see appendix). Each 
ethnic group is coded separately， as is each ethnic party 
Independent viα口αbles
Political Discrimination and Political Rights are the scores of 
governmental integration policy about political official discrimination 
and empowerment for minorities. These are first independent variables 
used to assess this article's hypothesis. It is coded from the Minorities 
At Risk (MAR) project dataset ωThese variables are dummy variables 
If there is official political discrimination for ethnic minority (if 
MAR score takes 1)， Political Discrimination takes 1 and the others 
take O. If there is official empowerment policy for ethnic minority， 
Political Rights takes 1 and the others take 0 
Language Discrimination and Language Rights are the second 
independent variables used to evaluate argument. These variables 
indicate the status of ethnic minorities' languages. These variables 
are also on dummy scales. If official language policy is reslはlated
to use ethnic language even in civil society and outlines some type 
(3) Detailed definitions are: 1 -oficial political discrimination and intensive 
discrimination in civil society; 2 -no oficial discrimination but historical 
mter】引vediscrimination in civil society; 3 -no oficial discrimination hut 
weak discrimination in civil society; 4 'oficial protective policy but weak 
discrimination in civil society; 5 -there is no ethnic discrimination 
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of punishment， Language Discrimination takes 1 and the others 
take O. If minority language has or could have official status in 
the local or national unit， Language Right takes 1， and the others 
take O. 1 refer to Spolsky (2004) to make and code these variables 
Control Variables 
PR-SMD controls for the institutional efect as an explanation 
of the situation of ethnic parties. It is the proportion of seats (0-1) 
which is determined by Proportional Representation (PR) system 
Therefore， ifa country adopts a full Single-member district (SMD) 
system， this variable is coded as 0， and if a country adopts 
Mixed-systems and 120 of 200 seats are elected by a PR system， 
it is coded as 0.6 
Magnitude is the average number of district magnitude. When 
a country's magnitude has some extent of range between tiers， and 
tiers under a mixed-method system， this variable is coded with 
a large number in cording this variable， because small parties such 
as ethnic parties generally tend to run for in the district with 
larger magnitude 
Threshold is simply coded as the percentage that is needed 
to get seats in each country's national election. If some countries 
give ethnic groups some privileges as discharging of threshold， the 
simple Hare quota， which is needed for winning a seat， would be 
applied for coding 
EthnicSeats is dummy variables whether there are special mandate 
seats for ethnic minority or not. If there are， itis coded as 1. 
Fractionalization is the primary variable for controlling for 
socio-economic factors. The famous work by Alesina et al. (1997) 
is used here. This variable indicates the polarization of ethnicity 
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and language in each state. 
Composition is a variable that represents the ratio of each 
ethnic group composition in the national population. This is also 
a control variable for socio-economic factors. 1 coded this data from 
the CIA World 
LobbyActor 
Factbook's web resources. 
IS 
international factor 
control variable entertaining external or 
Jenne (2004， 2007) demonstrate that ethnic 
minority group enhance demands when they could take a support 
from external lobby actor (their national "Homeland" or the other 
organizations). Each minority group who has "national homeland" 
takes 1， and the others take 0 in this test. 
Pre-8eats measure the proportion of seat share by ethnic parties 
in pre-election. This variable is coded based on electoral result 
at time t-1 
1n regression analysis， there is correlation between political 
integration policy factors and language integration policy factors 
80， this analysis calculates separately from each other. Moreover， 
this study employs generalized linear model (GLM) method assuming 
two types of distribution， negative binominal distribution (NBD) 
and log-normal distribution (LND)， because many dependent variables 
are slanted to zero. 
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Table 2: The resul!s 01 s!a!is!ical analysis 
Dependent Variable: Proportion ofSeats Share by 
Ethnic Minority Parties 
Statistical恥1odel:Generalized Linear恥10del
Distribution assumption NBD LND 
modell model2 modcl 3 model4 
Composition 
0.038 0.079ホ 0.778事申 0.547 
(0.032) (0.040) (0.372) (0.394) 
Fractionalization 
1.210 1.093 24.959 8.273 
(2.107) ( 1.978) (26.048) (24.455) 
Threshold 
0.414 0.231 0.060 0.016 
(0.158) (0.163) (0.421 ) (0.409) 
EthnicSeats 
1.046寧事 0.774 5.691 1.457 
(0.522) (0.568) (7.799) (7.588) 
PR-SMD 
1.596 2.785*事$ 27.316 18.776 
(1.217) (0.983) (16.780) (14.079) 
Magnitude 
0.003 0.001 0.028 0.230 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.030) (0.030) 
LobbyActor 
1.845事事事 2.632事事事 7.949 14.576ホ申
(0.542) (0.427) (7.388) (5.856) 
Pre-Seats 
23.925*ホ* 21β20申*ホ 837.680ホ*寧 832.643*牢*
(6.114) (4.934) (71.923) (68.212) 
PoliticalDiscrimination 
2.403*事 19.770・
(0.835) (10.551) 
PoliticalRights 
0.747 14.470 
(0.606) (8.833) 
LanguageDiscrimination 
-1.043 31.989事
(1.315) (16.699) 
LanguageRights 
0.035 15.318輩申
(0.615) (6.578) 
Constant 
0ー.042 2.210 -42.198事$ -24.347 
(1.837) (1.458) (20.378) ( 15.578) 
p-value: omnibus test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
log likelihood -356.6 -359.2 -591.4 -589.8 
AfC 737.3 742.5 1206.8 1203.6 
N 124 124 124 124 
ホ申事 p< 0.01 *牟 p< 0.05 車 p< 0.10 
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We could observe several points from this result. First， political 
discrimination as policy output have significant effects to explain 
the proportion of seats won by ethnic parties. We could interpret 
that it is important whether official political acts of discrimination 
are implemented or not， as model land 3 show. When and where 
ethnic minorities obtain political rights， ethnic parties lose support. 
This is counterintuitive， but reasonable and line up with theoretical 
hypothesis of this study. Second， Language policies also appropriately 
have significance in model 4 as hypothesis predict. However， these 
lack significant effects in negative binominal regression. Third， 
Institutional factors could have some weak effect only in model 
1 and 2， but not consistently. There are ineffectiveness of electoral 
institutions' factors in model 3 and model 4. Third， Socio-Economic 
factors have never consistently affected the performance of ethnic 
minority parties well. Only demographic compositions of ethnic 
minorities show significance to explain dependent variables in model 
2 and 3. At last， presences of ethnic minority groups' national homeland 
slgnl日cantlypredict the winning seats by them. This may paritially 
explain why most of al Roma groups' parties have never been 
able to represent 
The credibility of winning seats by ethnic parties have been 
determined by its performance (pre-seαts variable)， even any other 
significant variables are controled. In other words， supporters of 
ethnic parties (most of them belong to an ethnic minority) did not 
be exclusively affected by variation of electoral institutions. Slhe 
votes for an ethnic party if its performance have been considerably 
good， but they avoids wasting a vote if such ethnic parties have 
failed to win seats; and al of a voter's behaviours are defined 
by these strategies. Moreover， this result also demonstrates that 
18(220) 
Explaining the Fate of Ethnic Minority Parties {Nakai} 
the fate of ethnic parties is not solely determined by electorateぜ
ideological principles. If ethnic voting had unusual aspect compared 
with general voting behaviour， and the expression of identity would 
be important for members of an ethnic minority， then they would 
vote without consideration of a party's performance in the last election 
However， they have changed their support for ethnic parties in 
response to the parties' capability. This infers the rationality of 
ethnic voters 
Regression analysis revealed the significance of the policy factor 
and of voters' responsive attitude. It represented the ineffectiveness 
and limitation of a perspective treating electoral institution as an 
sole determinant factor to explain the rise and fal of ethnic minority 
parties. This finding verifies the theoretical deduction in the above 
section， and has some relevance to the application of that theory 
to CEE post-communist democracies 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued about the divergent situations of ethnic 
minority political parties in newly democratised countries， and 
concludes that the fate of ethnic parties has been explained by 
a more actor-centric approach， which focuses especially on the changes 
in integration policy and the strategic voting behaviour of minority 
voters. Institutional or socio-economical explanations show some 
limitations 
Assuming voters' rationality and the responsibility for policy 
change， our theoretical and formalised deduction explains well the 
reason why ethnic parties could or could not win seats. Moreover， 
through an analysis of CEE democracies， the statistical verifications 
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support the theoretical argument empiricaJly. It has been shown 
that ethnic party supports seldom strongly depend on the neither 
electoral institutional factors nor socio-economic factors. Ethnic 
composition seems to be somewhat effective in accounting for ethnic 
parties' fates， but it is inconsistent. Policy does inf1uence whether 
ethnic minorities can enter the political arena or not 
This research showed the importance of the policy factor and 
of voters' incentives to explain ethnic parties' fates. The question 
about ethnic parties should be incJuded in questions about the party 
system， but cJassical works about party systems rarely define the 
variance among ethnic parties in CEE countries. My argument proposed 
a more plausible explanation for this question， and builds a bridge 
for further empirical research about ethnopolitics 
Appendix. Statistical analys回 units
Countl陪Sα凡delection yeαrs 
Estonia (1992， 1995， 1999， 2003， 2007)， 
Latvia (1993， 1995， 1998， 2002， 2006)， 
Lithuania (1992， 1996， 2000， 2004， 2008)， 
Poland [Lower Chamberl (1991， 1993， 1997， 2001， 2005， 2007)， 
Czech [Lower Chamberl (1996， 1998， 2002， 2006)， 
Slovakia (1994， 1998， 2002， 2006)， 
Hungary (1990， 1994， 1998， 2002， 2006)， 
Slovenia (1992， 1996， 2000， 2004， 2008)， 
Croatia (2000[Lower ChamberJ， 2003， 2007)， 
Serbia (incJuding Serbia Crna Gola) (2000， 2003， 2007， 2008)， 
Montenegro (2006)， 
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Albania (2005)， 
Macedonia (1994， 1998， 2002， 2006， 2008)， 
Bulgaria (1990， 1991， 1994， 1997， 2001， 2005)， 
Romania (1996， 2000， 2004， 2008)， 
Moldova (1994， 1998， 2001， 2005)， 
Ukraine (1994， 1998， 2002， 2006， 2007)。
Ethnic Minority p，αrtws 
Estonia: Our Home is Estonial United People's Partyl Constitutional 
Partyl Russian Party in Estonia， 
Latvia: Equal Rights， Russian Citizen Partyl National Harmony 
Partyl For Human Rights and United Latvial Concord Center， 
Lithuania: Lithuanian Russian Union/ Pole's Electoral Union of 
Lithuanial Pole's Electoral Alliance of Lithuanial Minority People's 
Alliance， 
Poland: German Minorityl Cultural Society of the Germans in the 
Opole District， 
Czech: Union of Slovak/ Community of Slovak/ Democratic Alliance 
of Slovaksl HSMS， Romany Civil Initiativel Romany National 
councill Polish Councill U nion of German culturel Council of 
Jewish Communities (This analysis excludes molavia'oriented 
parties because it is appropriate to treat those as regional parties)， 
Slovakia: Hungarian Coalition/ Hungarian Christian Democratic 
Movementl Coexistence， 
Hungary: National Minority Roundtablel Council of Gypsies in 
Hungaryl Roma Parliamentl Democratic Alliance Hungarian 
Gypsiesl Independent Gypsy Associationl Association of Germansl 
Democratic Union of Slovak in Hungaryl Jewish Cultural Alliancel 
Democratic Federation of Serbl Democratic Association of 
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Romaruan， 
81ovenia: ltalian UnionJ Interest Community of Hungarian Minority， 
Croatia: 8erb People's Partyl Independent Democratic 8erbian Partyl 
Party of Democratic Action of Croatial Democratic Union of 
Hungarian (This analysis excludes "Istoria deomcratic council" 
because it seems to be regional parties)， 
Montenegro: Serbian Radical Partyl 8erbian National Renewall 8erbian 
Fatherlandl 8erbia National Party (8NP)1 8NP-NP-D881 Together 
for Yugoslavial 8erb Listl Radical Party of Montenegrol 8erbian 
UnionJ Bosniak CoalitionJ Albanian Alternativel Albanians 
Togetherl Democratic Union of Albaniansl Liberals and Bosniak 
Party-Correct in the Past， Right for the Future， 
Albania: Unity for Human Right Party， 
Bulgaria: Movement for Rights and Freedoms， 
Romania: Association of Italians of Romanial Bulgarian Union of 
the Banatl Cultural Union of Ruthenians of Romania Uniunea/ 
democratic Forum of Germans of Romanial Democratic Union 
of 810vaks and Czechs in Romania/ Democratic U nion of 
Turco-Islamic Tatars of Romania/ Federation of Jewish 
Communities of Romanial Greek Union of Romania/ League 
of Albanians of Romanial Lipovan Russian Community of Romania/ 
Party of the Romal Turkish Democratic Union of Romanial Union 
of Armenians of Romanial Union of Croatians of Romania/ Union 
of Poles of Romania Dom Polskil Union of 8erbs of Romanial 
Union of 81avic Macedonians of Romanial Union of Ukrainians 
of Romania， 
Moldova: Unity-Transnistria， Union of Patriot Movementl Gagauz 
Peoplel Democratic Party of the Gagauz， 
Macedonia: Democratic Union for IntegrationJ Party for Democratic 
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Prosperityl Democratic League of Bosniaksl Democratic Party 
of Albaniansl Democratic Party of Serbsl United Party of Romas 
in Macedonia! Democratic Party of Turksl Party for Roma 
IntegrationJ Party of the Democratic Forces of Roma in Macedonial 
Democratic Party of the Bosnmiaksl Union of Roma in Macedonial 
Party for the Movement of Turks in Macedonia， 
Serbia: Hungarian CoalitionJ Bosniac List for a European Sanjakl 
Albanian CoalitionJ Roma Partyl Roma for Romal Roma Union 
of Serbial Montenegrin Partyl Alliance of Vojvodina Hungariansl 
Together for Tolerance ?anak， Kasza， Ljaji?1 Alliance of Vojvodina 
Magyarsl Democratic Fellowship of Vojvodina Hungariansl 
Democratic Reform Party of Muslims (This analysis defines 
Vojvodina oriented parties as regional parties except above)， 
Ukraine: Crimia Russian Partyl Democratic Movement of Donbas 
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